- European firms are deeply locked into foreign office suites and systems
- American platforms manage the communication backbones of Europe’s largest corporations
- Reliance on external providers exposes utilities and healthcare to foreign oversight
For years, European governments and corporations leaned heavily on American technology offerings instead of nurturing local alternatives.
That choice now carries visible consequences, as sanctions and shifting trade rules brought in by the Trump administration drastically reshape the balance of power.
A recent analysis of business email domains across Europe by Proton shows a striking majority of publicly listed firms rely on American providers such as Google and Microsoft.
Data reveals the depth of reliance
Behind the rhetoric of digital sovereignty, the reality is that much of Europe’s digital infrastructure rests on technology stacks that entities outside its borders control. This is not just about convenience software but also about essential systems that underpin finance, healthcare, and utilities.
Email may appear mundane, but it often serves as the gateway to office software, online collaboration platforms, and cloud-based storage.
When a company commits to a provider for email, it usually adopts the full suite, embedding foreign technology deep into its operations.
This trend is not limited to smaller economies but also includes the continent’s largest players, where dependence cuts across industries from energy and telecommunications to pharmaceuticals.
In countries like Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden, over 90% of publicly listed companies rely on American services for email and related infrastructure.
However, the shocker is probably Ireland, which is at loggerheads with the US on several policies, but 93% of its businesses depend on American tech.
The UK, although mostly an ally of the US, has an alarming 88% of businesses relying on US tech, while other European heavyweights like Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland recorded 74%, 72%, and 68% of businesses relying on US tech, respectively.
Even France, which often champions its own autonomy, sees two out of three (66%) companies tied to US providers.
Eastern European countries like Bulgaria (16%) and Romania (39%) are the least dependent on American tech, and Russia is not even on the list of nations dependent on the US.
National security concerns emerge when utilities, transport systems, and healthcare facilities communicate through networks governed by foreign jurisdictions, but perhaps not when the network belongs to the US.
The reliance stretches far beyond convenience; it embeds itself in the very systems Europeans use every day – dependence on foreign technology does not just present a financial vulnerability; it raises questions about surveillance, geopolitical leverage, and the future of innovation.
AI training programs outside Europe’s control can sweep in sensitive business data, while reliance on external platforms exposes companies to warrantless legal demands.
This arrangement has also fostered a talent and capital drain, as engineers and investors direct their focus toward Silicon Valley rather than strengthening European ecosystems, whether through proprietary services or alternative Linux distros.
Some argue that American technology simply offers the best tools available, which may be true in terms of efficiency and global reach, yet the consequences of reliance are increasingly hard to ignore, since the US can turn off the switch at any time, and thousands of companies will be in crisis.
The fact that so many European firms cannot operate without American software demonstrates the fragile nature of Europe’s autonomy.
Rather than securing independence, Europe risks locking itself further into external dependencies at a moment when political winds in Washington are shifting.
