First, EU countries that so wish should form an alliance with other countries in Europe, like the U.K. and Norway, as well as those on other continents — like Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and others, including developing countries— to promote non-authoritarian rules-based democracies.
Besides freeing us from the incorrect assumption that the world is now Trumpian, such an alliance should give new momentum to free trade and multilateral governance, and pay special attention to the provision of global public goods. Crucially, however, this coalition shouldn’t be antagonistic to the U.S. like the BRICS grouping increasingly is. On the contrary, it should welcome good-faith cooperation with the U.S. — to the extent that Washington is ready to pursue progress along the lines that it had promoted, more than any other country, since World War II. And cooperation with BRICS countries should also be fostered to the extent that it isn’t oriented against the U.S.
Next, both the EU and the G7 must resume their autonomy when it comes to their own policies. Given the failed strategy of propitiatory gifts, partners who recently departed from their established policy stances to give the U.S. concessions should politely withdraw them. The citizens and businesses of those countries should pressure their governments to do so — not least to relieve them of the hidden taxes they’d otherwise have to pay to subsidize U.S. citizens and businesses.
This is the case with the global minimum tax. At the G7 summit in Canada this June, all members accepted America’s request to exempt U.S. companies from this first modest step against tax avoidance and evasion by multinational companies. But the formal procedure for this concession is yet to be completed at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. And given that the U.S. cashed this favor at the G7 without moderating its stance on tariffs as expected, it would be fair if the G7 countries and the EU chose not to proceed.
Furthermore, as a concession to the U.S. government, the EU had removed the digital tax from its list of potential new own resources in its next multiannual budget. Readers may have to read this a few times before they can believe that a supposedly sovereign supranational entity voluntarily surrendered its autonomy to the will of a third country for a decade to come.
If a personal reminiscence is allowed, we experienced similar U.S. pressures at the European Commission in the early 2000s, from a president many feared after he had started two wars — one in Afghanistan and one in Iraq. Then-President George W. Bush warned us not to dare apply EU competition rules to U.S. multinationals or to the digital economy generally. But while we politely listened and took note, we went on with our jobs.
And finally, there’s defense. I want to underline one point here: I don’t regard the commitment to cover a higher share of the burden on defense as a propitiatory gift or concession. Several presidents before Trump had pressed Europe on the matter — and rightly so, in my view.
In fact, even in the unlikely event that the U.S. were to withdraw its demand, I believe Europe should go ahead with it. U.S. foreign policy is growing increasingly volatile, and we shouldn’t hang our defense on the whimsical politics of a great nation that, despite its history of helping save us from Nazism and Fascism and protecting us from Soviet Communism, now has future strategies that might be more aligned with autocratic regimes than with the values we’ve shared for 80 years.
